In the second half of 2014 Labour Women established a Commission on Repeal of the 8th Amendment, i.e. the provision of the Irish Constitution that protects “the right to life of the unborn” and has been used to sharply restrict the availability of abortion in Ireland. I was one of the legal experts in the Commission and, in that role, I worked with nine other feminist lawyers: Mairead Enright, Vicky Conway, Mary Donnelly, Ruth Fletcher, Natalie McDonnell, Sheelagh McGuinness, Claire Murray, Sinead Ring and Sorcha Ui Chonnachtaigh. We produced a draft structure and content for legislation that aimed to take into account the constraints within which we were working, political realities, and standards outlined in international human rights law. Continue reading “Reforming Abortion Law in Ireland: A Model”
Category: Irish constitutional law
New Paper on Constitutionalising Foetal Rights
I have posted a working version of my new paper, ‘Constitutionalizing Fetal Rights: A Salutary Tale from Ireland’ on SSRN for free download. The final version will be published this winter in the Michigan Journal of Gender and the Law.
The paper considers how the idea of ‘foetal rights’ made its way into the Irish Constitution in 1983. With the 8th Amendment, Ireland became the first country to explicitly recognise the foetus as a constitutional rights bearer, and the repercussions of that for law, medicine and politics–not to mention for pregnant women–have been immense. In the paper, I outline those developments and argue that, by constitutionalising foetal rights, a system blocks out the space forpersonal moral judgement in reproductive decisions, medical judgement in clinical decisions, and political judgement in policy decisions. This has particularly been the case in Ireland, where an über conservative interpretation has been applied to the 8th Amendment, not only in the earlier cases that foreclosed information provision, for example, but also in very recent cases appearing to establish a constitutional concept of foetal best interests.
There is still time for me to make revisions to this paper, and comments are most welcome. You can download the paper for free here, and it is also attached to this post here. The formal abstract states:
In 1983, Ireland became the first country in the world to constitutionalize fetal rights. The 8th Amendment to the Constitution, passed by a referendum of the People, resulted in constitutional protection for “the right to life of the unborn”, which was deemed “equal” to the right to life of the “mother”. Since then, enshrining fetal rights in constitutions and in legislation has emerged as a key part of anti-abortion campaigning. This article traces the constitutionalization of fetal rights in Ireland and its implications for law, politics and women. In so doing, it provides a salutary tale of such an approach.
More than thirty years after the 8th Amendment it has become clear that Ireland now has an abortion law regime that is essentially ‘unliveable’. Not only that, but it has a body of jurisprudence so deeply determined by a constitutionalized fetal rights orientation that law, politics and medical practice are deeply impacted and strikingly constrained. This is notwithstanding the clear hardship women in Ireland experience as a result of constitutionalized fetal rights and the resultant almost-total prohibition on accessing abortion in Ireland.
This article argues that, wherever one stands on the question of whether legal abortion ought to be broadly available in a particular jurisdiction, constitutionalizing fetal rights leaves no meaningful space for judgement at either political or personal levels. Rather, the outcome of all arguments for a more liberal abortion law regime is effectively pre-determined in the negative. Furthermore, constitutionalizing fetal rights can have unforeseen implications across jurisprudence and medical practice, creating a situation in which there is essentially no space for more liberal interpretations that respect women’s reproductive autonomy. While this may be desirable from an ideological perspective for those who hold a firm anti-abortion position, it is distinctively problematic for women and for politics.
Marriage Equality, Human Rights, and the Upcoming Referendum
This is a cross-post from Human Rights in Ireland about the marriage equality referendum which will be held in Ireland on May 22.
Over the last few weeks, campaigning on Ireland’s marriage equality referendum has been taking place in earnest. While the ‘yes’ side entered the formal referendum campaign with a steady lead in the polls and has long been well organised, the ‘no’ side has emerged rapidly and, in some ways, chaotically, scoring successes along the way (for example, through amendment of the proposed Irish language text).
The ‘no’ campaign has certainly been gaining traction. This is not unusual in constitutional referenda, when the burden of establishing that the status quo ought to be changed lies firmly with the ‘yes’ campaign, as it should do. In some ways, the ‘no’ campaign may seem unstructured, disorganised and ad hoc; after all, it has no particular supra-structure to shape it as all major political parties support the referendum (which in itself is not at all unusual) and the Irish Association of Catholic Priests has elected to take a neutral position. Furthermore, the ‘no’ side seems to comprise everything from prolific letter writers, to the Iona Institute, to Bruce Arnold sending ‘private study papers’ (which appears to more or less be a structured ‘letter’) to members of the Oireachtas, all raising such a range of arguments that they are difficult to address in a coherent way. These arguments include everything from the utter canard of assisted human reproduction and surrogacy (excellently dismissed by Conor O’Mahony here), to the bizarre suggestion that somehow children raised by married same-sex parents will not have grandmothers. However, in my view, the campaign against marriage equality—and the infrequently-articulated ‘real’ concern in many people’s minds—is not about children, or family, or even marriage; it is about the ‘specialness’ of heterosexuality.
Marriage is now pretty much the only thing that is ‘special’ about heterosexuality; it is the only institution from which the state expressly excludes people who are in same-sex relationships (the majority of whom identify as, and are perceived as being, gay or lesbian). With the exception of s. 37, which is being addressed, discrimination in employment is no longer possible; people who identify as LGBT exist in every profession, job and field of work. Discrimination in the provision of goods and services is prohibited. The Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 addresses questions of adoption and family form for same-sex parents and their children. Marriage is all that is left. Marriage is all that is now exclusively heterosexual.*
For me, this is what the marriage equality referendum is really about.
By voting ‘yes’, one will signal that they do not believe that heterosexuality or opposite-sex attraction ought to have exclusive access to the constitutionally recognised and protected status of ‘marriage’. By voting ‘no’, one will indicate the contrary. That is not a matter that relates to the nature of marriage as a constitutional or legal question; it is one that relates to one’s belief about the nature of different sexual orientations.
The reality is that in deciding this matter by means of constitutional referendum, a minority population is asking the heterosexual majority to give up some of their privilege; to recognise their fellow citizens and inhabitants of Ireland as equally entitled to enter into the constitutionally-recognised institution of marriage. This is why the marriage equality referendum is correctly referred to as a referendum about human rights.
Numerous representatives of or adherents to the ‘no’ side argue that, as there is no “human right to gay marriage”, this is not a referendum about human rights at all. They are right to say that Article 12 of the ECHR, for example, does not expressly protect a right to enter into same-sex marriage, although they neglect to note that it may be interpreted as doing so as a European consensus on marriage equality emerges. They also fail to mention, for example, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which purposefully does not limit the right to marry to opposite-sex couples. However, even beyond the potential of these texts, the fact that this referendum is about recognition means that it is inherently about rights.
The great British Idealist, T.H. Green, famously wrote that “rights are made by recognition”. While not wanting to over-simplify his recognition thesis, for Green a right is dependent on “a society of men who recognise each other as isoi kai homoioi”, i.e. as equals. The marriage equality referendum is almost as explicit an example of this as one can imagine; it is a minority community asking the majority to recognise them as equals by opening up the last zone of exclusion and giving full effect to their constitutional citizenship. This is why even people who, for political and feminist reasons, may have difficulties with the institution of marriage per se, have been so vociferous in their support of the ‘yes’ campaign; because they see that this is a referendum about more than marriage. It is, truly, about equality; equality of esteem, equality of access, equality of citizenship.
Marriage equality will not end homophobia; it will not, on its own, make Ireland an equal society. To achieve that requires far more than marriage equality and a far broader reform agenda. But a ‘yes’ vote on May 22nd would be a statement about the kind of country we want to be; do we want to be a state in which we recognise that sexual orientation is not an acceptable basis for any kind of exclusion, or do we want to maintain the exclusionary and unequal status quo?
People are entitled to vote however they wish on May 22nd; the nature of our system of constitutional change is such that the minority seeking emancipation from oppressive or exclusionary laws and practices permitted or mandated by the Constitution must subject themselves to the will of the majority. We must, as Green would say, request recognition as equals. However, when deciding how to vote it is important that we recognise that a ‘no’ vote involves more than ‘merely’ upholding an historical or ‘traditional’ conception of marriage. It is a decision of the electoral majority to maintain heterosexual privilege and to perpetuate inequality.
That is what this referendum is really about.
That is why it is fundamentally a question of human rights.
* Of course, gay and bisexual people can marry someone of the opposite sex. However, by describing marriage as exclusively heterosexual I mean that it is only possible, in Irish law, between one man and one woman expected to engage in a sexual relationship, i.e. that it is built on an expectation of ‘typical’ behaviour determined by heterosexual social norms.
New article on Irish abortion law (Enright & de Londras)
Update I have now attached pre-print version of the article to this post.
My latest article, co-authored with Màiréad Enright (Kent), has just been published. Part of a special issue of the Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland to reflect on the first year of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, the conclusion of the paper presents a summarised version of the argument thus:
The cases of Miss Y and Savita Halappanavar demonstrate that the Eighth Amendment has been reduced, over the years, to a catalogue of anomalies, unexplained readings, missed opportunities and speculative silences. Although the constitutional text might be applied in a manner that more appropriately recognises women’s autonomy as well as their rights to health, bodily integrity and privacy, this would require a fundamental shift in the interpretation of Art.40.3.3°, led either by the judiciary or the Oireachtas. This is a highly unlikely prospect owing to a likely reluctance by the judiciary to engage in such activism in the field of abortion jurisprudence, given the political fallout from the X case, probable political resistance to grasping the nettle of abortion law reform and cross-party disagreement on the appropriate legal regime in Ireland. In this sort of instance, constitutional reform by means of a referendum is clearly required. The shape of such reform might be decided following a period of consultation, perhaps by means of a specially-convened constitutional convention. However, before that can happen, we must agree, in principle, that the status quo is unsustainable. The cases of Miss Y and Savita Halappanavar, which frame this article, bring the hardship caused by the Eighth Amendment into stark relief.
The full citation is Mairead Enright & Fiona de Londras, “‘Empty Without and Empty Within’: the Unworkability of the Eighth Amendment after Savita Halappanavar & Miss Y” (2014) 20 Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 85