Referrals to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR

images-4Over the past year or so I have been working on a small-scale project exploring referrals to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 43 of the Convention.

The project started out with me being interested in why no reasons are given for the refusal to accept a referral request, however it has moved on to concentrate on the concept of ‘seriousness’ as used in the relevant provisions of the Convention and rules of court. The key question that I am concerned with is how we identify which questions are ‘serious enough’ for the Grand Chamber to be convened, bearing in mind that hearing a case before the Grand Chamber involves a substantial investment in time, resources and judicial energies.

Article 43 provides:

  1. Within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber.
  2. A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber shall accept the request if the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance.
  3. If the panel accepts the request, the Grand Chamber shall decide the case by means of a judgment.

RefsThe project, which I am now writing up, studies referral requests and decisions from 2011-2014. This confirms that the acceptance rate for referral requests is very low (as demonstrated by the chart to the left) and that the nature of the alleged violation is not, per se, the relevant indicator of seriousness. Rather, seriousness is determined largely by reference to the potential implications of the decision ‘below’ for consistency, evolution and jurisprudential coherence related to the Convention.

I presented this as a ‘work in progress’ to the Oxford Human Rights Hub where I am a visiting fellow this year back in February, and the audio from the presentation is available here. There is a very limited amount of scholarship on Article 43 referrals, at least in English. I would be grateful for suggestions from any readers who are aware of relevant work as I move towards finalising this paper.

CfP: Irish Yearbook of International Law

iyilSiobhán Mullally and I, the editors of the Irish Yearbook of International Law, welcome submissions for publication in the Yearbook.

Articles should not be published or under consideration for publication elsewhere.

An annual, peer reviewed publication, the Irish Yearbook of International Law is committed to the publication of articles of general interest in international law as well as articles that have a particular connection to, or relevance for, Ireland. Articles are usually 10,000 to 12,000 words in length, although longer submissions will be considered. The Yearbook also publishes a small number of shorter articles and notes, which should not exceed 6,000 words.

Submissions, comprising a brief 100-word abstract, article and confirmation of exclusive submission, should be sent to both Professor Siobhán Mullally (s.mullally@ucc.ie) and Professor Fiona de Londras (fiona.de-londras@durham.ac.uk) by 30 June 2015. (Submissions are also accepted on a rolling basis).

Anyone wishing to review a particular title in the Yearbook’s book review section is also invited to contact the editors. Further information on the Yearbook (including style guide) is available at the IYIL website. The Irish Yearbook of International Law is published by Hart-Bloomsbury and is also available on HEIN Online.

Marriage Equality, Human Rights, and the Upcoming Referendum

This is a cross-post from Human Rights in Ireland about the marriage equality referendum which will be held in Ireland on May 22.

Over the last few weeks, campaigning on Ireland’s marriage equality referendum has been taking place in earnest. While the ‘yes’ side entered the formal referendum campaign with a steady lead in the polls and has long been well organised, the ‘no’ side has emerged rapidly and, in some ways, chaotically, scoring successes along the way (for example, through amendment of the proposed Irish language text).

The ‘no’ campaign has certainly been gaining traction. This is not unusual in constitutional referenda, when the burden of establishing that the status quo ought to be changed lies firmly with the ‘yes’ campaign, as it should do. In some ways, the ‘no’ campaign may seem unstructured, disorganised and ad hoc; after all, it has no particular supra-structure to shape it as all major political parties support the referendum (which in itself is not at all unusual) and the Irish Association of Catholic Priests has elected to take a neutral position. Furthermore, the ‘no’ side seems to comprise everything from prolific letter writers, to the Iona Institute, to Bruce Arnold sending ‘private study papers’ (which appears to more or less be a structured ‘letter’) to members of the Oireachtas, all raising such a range of arguments that they are difficult to address in a coherent way. These arguments include everything from the utter canard of assisted human reproduction and surrogacy (excellently dismissed by Conor O’Mahony here), to the bizarre suggestion that somehow children raised by married same-sex parents will not have grandmothers. However, in my view, the campaign against marriage equality—and the infrequently-articulated ‘real’ concern in many people’s minds—is not about children, or family, or even marriage; it is about the ‘specialness’ of heterosexuality.

Marriage is now pretty much the only thing that is ‘special’ about heterosexuality; it is the only institution from which the state expressly excludes people who are in same-sex relationships (the majority of whom identify as, and are perceived as being, gay or lesbian). With the exception of s. 37, which is being addressed, discrimination in employment is no longer possible; people who identify as LGBT exist in every profession, job and field of work. Discrimination in the provision of goods and services is prohibited. The Children and Family Relationships Act 2015 addresses questions of adoption and family form for same-sex parents and their children. Marriage is all that is left. Marriage is all that is now exclusively heterosexual.*

For me, this is what the marriage equality referendum is really about.

By voting ‘yes’, one will signal that they do not believe that heterosexuality or opposite-sex attraction ought to have exclusive access to the constitutionally recognised and protected status of ‘marriage’. By voting ‘no’, one will indicate the contrary. That is not a matter that relates to the nature of marriage as a constitutional or legal question; it is one that relates to one’s belief about the nature of different sexual orientations.

The reality is that in deciding this matter by means of constitutional referendum, a minority population is asking the heterosexual majority to give up some of their privilege; to recognise their fellow citizens and inhabitants of Ireland as equally entitled to enter into the constitutionally-recognised institution of marriage. This is why the marriage equality referendum is correctly referred to as a referendum about human rights.

Numerous representatives of or adherents to the ‘no’ side argue that, as there is no “human right to gay marriage”, this is not a referendum about human rights at all. They are right to say that Article 12 of the ECHR, for example, does not expressly protect a right to enter into same-sex marriage, although they neglect to note that it may be interpreted as doing so as a European consensus on marriage equality emerges. They also fail to mention, for example, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which purposefully does not limit the right to marry to opposite-sex couples. However, even beyond the potential of these texts, the fact that this referendum is about recognition means that it is inherently about rights.

The great British Idealist, T.H. Green, famously wrote that “rights are made by recognition”. While not wanting to over-simplify his recognition thesis, for Green a right is dependent on “a society of men who recognise each other as isoi kai homoioi”, i.e. as equals. The marriage equality referendum is almost as explicit an example of this as one can imagine; it is a minority community asking the majority to recognise them as equals by opening up the last zone of exclusion and giving full effect to their constitutional citizenship. This is why even people who, for political and feminist reasons, may have difficulties with the institution of marriage per se, have been so vociferous in their support of the ‘yes’ campaign; because they see that this is a referendum about more than marriage. It is, truly, about equality; equality of esteem, equality of access, equality of citizenship.

Marriage equality will not end homophobia; it will not, on its own, make Ireland an equal society. To achieve that requires far more than marriage equality and a far broader reform agenda. But a ‘yes’ vote on May 22nd would be a statement about the kind of country we want to be; do we want to be a state in which we recognise that sexual orientation is not an acceptable basis for any kind of exclusion, or do we want to maintain the exclusionary and unequal status quo?

People are entitled to vote however they wish on May 22nd; the nature of our system of constitutional change is such that the minority seeking emancipation from oppressive or exclusionary laws and practices permitted or mandated by the Constitution must subject themselves to the will of the majority. We must, as Green would say, request recognition as equals. However, when deciding how to vote it is important that we recognise that a ‘no’ vote involves more than ‘merely’ upholding an historical or ‘traditional’ conception of marriage. It is a decision of the electoral majority to maintain heterosexual privilege and to perpetuate inequality.

That is what this referendum is really about.

That is why it is fundamentally a question of human rights.

* Of course, gay and bisexual people can marry someone of the opposite sex. However, by describing marriage as exclusively heterosexual I mean that it is only possible, in Irish law, between one man and one woman expected to engage in a sexual relationship, i.e. that it is built on an expectation of ‘typical’ behaviour determined by heterosexual social norms.

The Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism: New Book!

9781138854130My new book, co-edited with Josephine Doody, on The Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism has now been published by Routledge. The book is available on Google Books here, and can be purchased through Routledge and Amazon. The collection brings together key insights from my FP7-funded project SECILE, which completed last autumn. Featuring chapters from key researchers in the field, it presents empirically-informed findings of the project, together with broader theoretical and principled analyses of how to enhance and assess impact, legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU context. The table of contents is below, and I have also attached a pre-print version of the introduction to this post.

1. Introduction: The Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU, Fiona de Londras and Josephine Doody Part I: EU Counter-Terrorism: Its Scope and Institutions 2. Taking stock: the evolution, adoption, implementation and evaluation of EU counter-terrorism policy, Ben Hayes and Chris Jones 3. The Institutional Framework of EU Counter-Terrorism, Josephine Doody Part II: Disciplinary Perspectives on EU Counter-Terrorism 4. Assessing Counter-Terrorism as a Matter of Human Rights: Perspectives from the European Court of Human Rights, Mathias Vermeulen 5. The Societal Impact of EU Counterterrorism, Peter Burgess and Médéric Martins Maze 6. Democratic legitimacy, effectiveness and impact of EU counter-terrorism measures, Yulia Chistyakova 7. Social Appropriateness in EU’s Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy, Bruno Oliveira Martins Part III: Practical Perspectives on EU Counter-Terrorism 8. The Perspectives of Counter-terrorism Operatives on EU Counter-terrorism Law and Policy, Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda and Lucy Hoyte 9. Civil Society Perspectives on EU Counter-Terrorism, Josephine Doody and Rose van der Hilst 10. ‘Closing the Loop’ on EU Counter-Terrorism: Review as Key to Understanding Impact and Enhancing Legitimacy, Fiona de Londras

Here is the Intro outlining the individual chapters.

My chapter in the collection is entitled “Governance Gaps in EU counter terrorism: implications for democracy and constitutionalism”. In it I argue that the making and implementation of EU counter-terrorism raises serious questions as to the extent to which this limb of the Union’s activities is undertaken in accordance with the constitutionalist spirit of the Union and, if not, what implications this may have for constitutionalism and legitimacy within the EU. Although some of these concerns have been doctrinally (if not yet practically) resolved through the dissolution of the three pillars and further empowerment of the European Parliament in the Lisbon Treaty, a number of fundamental concerns persist. The chapter starts by outlining the scope of the EU’s counter-terrorism activities since 2001, before going on to consider the paper’s framing concepts of constitutionalism and legitimacy. Building on this, the paper then assess EU counter-terrorism by reference to provenance, process, democratic oversight and effectiveness in order to consider the extent to which EU constitutionalism may be compromised or called into question in the field of counter-terrorism as so far engaged with by the Union. I argue that the EU experiences constitutionalist tensions in the making and implementation of counter-terrorism law and policy, some of which are resolved by the courts of the EU, but the nature of which point to the need to build further constitutionalist structures into EU counter-terrorism.