Latest Publication: Guantánamo Bay and Constitutionalism

I am delighted to see the publication of David Jenkins, Anders Henriksen & Amanda Jacobsen (eds), The Long Decade: How 9/11 Has Changed the Law by Oxford University Press this week. This collection emanates from what was an extremely stimulating workshop at the University of Copenhagen some years ago, where the implications for law (in the United States but also more generally) were explored by a large group of us assembled for the task. My chapter in the collection is entitled ‘Guantánamo Bay, the Rise of Courts and the Revenge of Politics’, and the abstract is below. An earlier version can be downloaded on SSRN.

Although a core part of Barak Obama’s election platform, the closure of Guantánamo Bay has proven more difficult to bring about than anticipated. This difficulty has primarily emanated from the persistent opposition to closure found within the United States Congress and given practical effect through legislative measures that make closure difficult, if not impossible. Understanding this divergence between Executive policy and Congressional preferred outcomes in the national security arena requires us to ask a simple question, which lies at the core of this paper: is Congress acting in a purely political or a politically constitutionalist manner? In other words, is this merely a question of politics or is Congress using Guantánamo Bay as the site upon which to sketch its vision of the appropriate relationship between different organs of government? That question takes on an added level of resonance in the context of Guantánamo Bay because of the series of US Supreme Court cases making it clear that the detention centre there is subject to law and, more specifically, to constitutional and constitutionalist limits. In this short essay, I address this question and argue that, rather than communicating a grand constitutional message, Congressional obstructionism in this context is politics as usual and should be understood as such.

Two Calls for Participation: IYIL and Emergencies

ImageTwo projects I am involved in are inviting participants at present: the 2013 issue of the Irish Yearbook of International Law, which I co-edit with Prof. Siobhan Mullally in UCC, and an interdisciplinary conversation about ‘The (In)Adequacy of the Emergency Paradigm’. Continue reading “Two Calls for Participation: IYIL and Emergencies”

Counter-Terrorist Judicial Review Project Completed

Over the past year or so I have been working with my UNSW colleague Fergal F. Davis on a project entitled ‘Critical Debates on Counter-Terrorist Judicial Review’ which was generously funded by the BA/Leverhulme small grant scheme as well as some supplementary funding from USNW and administrative support from Durham HRC. The project has now come to an end, and a summary of the project is available here. The book of the project, which includes some of the world’s leading scholars on the issue, is now available for pre-order from CUP and includes not just this wideranging scene-setting paper from myself and Fergal but also a new paper by me outlining what I call the ‘regulatory constitutionalism’ of superior domestic courts in at least some CT judicial review decisions implicating foreign affairs powers. I look forward to the reaction (!)

Reflections on the David Miranda Case

The high-profile decision in R (Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department was released earlier this week. In it, the Court affirmed the proportionality of the controversial Schedule 7 powers to stop and question individuals at ports and airports, which includes a power to seize laptops, phones etc. The use of these powers is proportionate, the Court held, even when it interferes with journalistic freedom of expression where such freedom of expression might result in the disclosure of information that could (inadvertently) aid terrorists in some way.

Although there is much to be said on the implications of the case for Schedule 7, the proportionality test, and journalistic freedom (on which see Helena Kennedy QC, Paul Daly, Colin Murray and Mark Elliot), Miranda also raises interesting questions about how we manage secrecy in the counter-terrorist context. This is the element I have been most interested in, and I wrote a short opinion on it for the Oxford Human Rights Hub, which I then republished in longer form on Human Rights in Ireland. The thrust of these posts is:

Journalism—which creates ‘public public’ transparency—may not always have the capabilities to make the kinds of security judgement necessary to assess whether a particular piece of information ought to be in the public domain, but neither ought we allow security agencies to monopolise both the information that we use to assess threats and the decisions as to disclosure. While the judgment in Miranda may please the security sector by its affirmation of the former proposition, the entire affair makes it clear that the latter must be addressed as a matter of urgency.

Managing secrecy (beyond what arises in relation to closed materials in court procedures) is part of counter-terrorism that many legal scholars (including myself) have often avoided dealing with head-on. I am not sure we can do that for much longer and in my next book (which I am just finishing up) I try to tackle secrecy and transparency as matters of constitutionalism; a daunting task!